Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Lin Yen Ting/Office of the President/CC BY 4.0
DUELING COMMEMORATIONS of the 823 Artillery Bombardment took place yesterday in Kinmen. 823 refers to the Chinese attack on Kinmen that started the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. In many ways, between the commemorations held by KMT and DPP, the two commemorations were much more about life today.
At an outdoor ceremony despite heavy rain, President Lai Ching-te of the DPP framed 823 as showing peace through strength, in that the military forces of the ROC were able to fight off Chinese forces to maintain Taiwan’s safety.
In line with this, Lai touted efforts by his government to shore up Taiwan’s defense. This includes increasing military spending, salaries and benefits for soldiers, and strengthening drone capabilities. Lai said that efforts to strengthen defense were in the spirit of 823.
On the other hand, Cheng Li-wun of the KMT, speaking at the 823 Artillery Bombardment Museum, called on Lai to accept the 1992 Consensus. Cheng claimed that there could only be a foundation for peace if Lai accepted the 1992 Consensus, and suggested that cross-strait relations involving peaceable exchanges could resume if only Lai chose to do so.
To this extent, Cheng framed Lai and the DPP as irrationally committed to the political project of pursuing independence. Cheng suggested that Lai seeks to revise the ROC constitution and other means aimed at Taiwanese independence, even if this would mean war.
Battles that took place in Kinmen, such as the 823 Artillery Bombardment or the Battle of Guningtou, have historically occupied a large pride of place in the KMT’s framing of history. In particular, the 823 Artillery Bombardment, Battle of Guningtou, and other conflicts in Kimen are remembered as victories for the ROC that were able to ward off future attacks on Taiwan, preserving the existence of the ROC and of Taiwan. By contrast, the DPP historically viewed the ROC military with suspicion, seeing as the ROC military was the KMT’s enforcer during authoritarian times.
Yet things have changed now for the KMT–as well as the DPP. It is the DPP that is now in the position of attempting to shore up Taiwan’s defenses against China, while the KMT has become an accommodationist party to China–inclusive of attempting to gut Taiwan’s defenses. This has led to the odd historical reversal where the DPP now has sought to improve the image of the military, and this has included recapitulating its view of history. To this extent, while the KMT has left itself open to accusations of having given up entirely on the ROC in order to make way for siding with the PRC, in order to avoid accusations that it seeks to disrupt the status quo by pursuing independence, the DPP has embraced the ROC and its institutions.
Still, one notes that Kinmen itself heavily slants KMT in terms of elections. The KMT continues to be popular there, in spite of the fact that one perspective on Kinmen history would be that the KMT enmired the residents of Kinmen in conflict with China. Moreover, one notes that as with Taiwan as a whole, the KMT’s actions were heavily repressive in Kinmen during martial law–that fact does not seem to have dissuaded the public from favoring the KMT in elections.