Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Han Kuo-yu/Facebook
AN UNUSUAL SPLIT seems to have become visible in the KMT, with Legislative Yuan president Han Kuo-yu lashing out at KMT legislative caucus leader Fu Kun-chi earlier this month. Specifically, Han criticized Fu for failing to appear at cross-party negotiations over the budget.
The KMT delayed on the budget for 350 days since it was submitted by the Executive Yuan for review last year, only allowing it to pass its third reading last week. Last week, however, Han criticized Fu for repeatedly being absent from negotiations, while the DPP and TPP legislative caucus leaders had been present. Han also criticized Fu for failing to authorize his deputy, Lin Pei-hsiang, to conduct negotiations on the KMT’s behalf.
In response, Fu called for unity within the KMT, while stating that he meant no disrespect to Han. To this extent, Fu has framed his absence from the legislature as a means of protesting against the DPP, for what he claims to be the DPP central government’s disrespect to the legislature.
It should be clear, however, that Han is aiming to differentiate his political brand from KMT heavyweights perceived as increasingly pro-China. For example, one notes that after KMT party chair Cheng Li-wun traveled to the US, Han also traveled to the US shortly after.
Though some at the time perceived Han’s travels as attempting to clean up after Cheng, in all probability, Han saw a political opportunity created by the rising perception of Cheng as dead set on an ideological agenda of unification. As such, Han has attempted to depict himself as a moderate by comparison, aligning with historically moderate politicians such as fellow legislator Johnny Chiang.
Ironically, this was far from how Han was perceived in the 2020 election cycle during his stint as the KMT’s presidential candidate, when Han was perceived as a similar hardliner. The possibility of Han becoming president, at the time, provoked what was termed a sense of “national doom.”
Han would not be the only KMT hardliner to try and rebrand his reputation in recent times. Media commentator Jaw Shaw-kong, the KMT’s 2024 vice presidential candidate has also sought to rebrand himself as a moderate, despite his longstanding reputation for hardline views on unification.
The KMT’s internal dynamics, then, may be visible with this attempt by Han, Jaw, and others to rebrand. Namely, those who originally emphasized hardline political views have become aware of the public pushback against Cheng Li-wun, as a result of which they have sought to try and recast themselves as moderates. From this, one can see that there are clear splits emerging in the KMT between hardliners and moderates, but with choices largely made by politicians on the basis of differentiating their political brands from each other.
Yet from this, one also can see how KMT politicians–often highly experienced ones–perceive the general public perception of Cheng Li-wun and Fu Kun-chi, who are understood as aligned with each other in favor of hardline views. If historic hardliners are now pivoting to try and seem like moderates, that means that it is expected there will be backlash against Cheng and Fu from the general public in the near future.