Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
語言:
English
Photo Credit: MSchlauch/WikiCommons/Public Domain
PAPUA NEW GUINEA ordered the closure of Taiwan’s representative offices earlier this month, in another diplomatic setback for the Lai administration.
The overall impact is likely to be limited, in that Papua New Guinea is not a major trading or political partner of Taiwan. Nevertheless, the move is a sign of China’s rising influence in the region, in that Papua New Guinea is another Asia Pacific country.
Though Taiwan does not have diplomatic relations with Papua New Guinea, Taiwan has operated a representative office there since 1990. This followed a trade agreement signed the previous year.
The Lai administration has framed the closure of the office as a result of China’s international pressure, while the US has also expressed concern over the matter. On the other hand, China’s foreign ministry has praised the move, which was framed as in line with “One China.”
This is not the only time in recent memory that Taiwan has faced diplomatic pressure from China that manifests as pressure on diplomatic offices. Most often, this has involved the closure, forced move, or forced renaming of a representative office.
The most prominent example in recent memory may be with South Africa. In 2025, Taiwan lodged a protest over South Africa unilaterally renaming Taiwan’s representative office from the “Taipei Liaison Office” to the “Taipei Commercial Office.” It proved a relatively new move by countries seeking to pressure Taiwan’s diplomatic representation abroad to unilaterally change the name of representative offices.
This followed pressure from the South African government to move the representative office out of the capital city of Pretoria. The Taiwanese government responded by suggesting that it may order South Africa’s representative office to move out of Taipei, as a reciprocal move, as well as curbing semiconductor shipments to South Africa. The threat was a rare example of when Taiwan has flexed its dominance over global semiconductor manufacturing and, while the move was sufficient to cause South Africa to back down, Taiwan has not used the threat since. Indeed, doing so too often would likely cause Taiwan to be seen as using its dominance over semiconductor manufacturing irresponsibly.
As for Papua New Guinea, Taiwan has suggested that it may respond by ending imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the country, with Taiwan currently being the destination of 1/3rd of LNG exports from Papua New Guinea. It is unclear whether this would make Papua New Guinea reconsider its move, though one notes that at a time in which LNG shipments globally have been impacted by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Taiwan may be in pressing need of LNG–making it a question as to whether this is an advisable move to hit back at the diplomatic slight. Likewise, the current shortage of LNG shipments globally may make it easy for Papua New Guinea to find new markets.
It is to be seen how Taiwan hits back, then. Taiwan is expected to register its displeasure with Papua New Guinea in some way, but the ways it can do so are limited for a country that it does not otherwise have strong trade or political ties with. The Lai administration may also face criticism if the way it hits back is self-undermining for Taiwan, lending weight to criticisms that the Lai administration is reckless with symbolic actions that have little substantive gain for Taiwan.