Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Taiwankengo/WikiCommons/CC BY-SA 4.0
DPP LEGISLATOR Lin Chun-hsian publicized earlier this month that the police, coast guard, customs, and CPC Corporation are all suspected of using equipment of Chinese manufacture in biometric equipment. Such equipment was used for clocking in employees using their faces and fingerprints.
Such equipment is originally thought to be manufactured by ARMATURA, a subsidiary of ZKTeco, which is 99.98% owned by ZKTeco. That it ended up in police, coast guard, customs, and CPC use is because a Taiwanese company is suspected of rebranding and reselling the equipment. The NCC certification data for the devices, as well as their product descriptions, are identical to ARMATURA products. The instruction manual for the products, too, retains terms used in China but not Taiwan.
Reportedly, such purchases of equipment took place across a decade, with the Taiwanese company in question winning 16 tenders. Lin has called for a review of the procurement process, suggesting that designated government agencies should not be allowed to decide on purchases of equipment that store biometric or other sensitive data. Lin has also suggested an issue with the current procurement process, in that even equipment pertaining to national security must go to the lowest bidder, meaning that this incentivizes the purchase of what may be Chinese equipment.
This is hardly the first time that a Taiwanese company has been found to be passing off Chinese products as Taiwanese ones, even in government tenders that would be in the limelight. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, it proved an embarrassment for the Tsai administration when members of the “national team” convened to boost production of medical masks were found to be passing off Chinese-manufactured masks as Taiwanese ones.
Likewise, there have been other cases in which Chinese technology has found its way into sensitive equipment that pertains to national security. In 2022, the luggage self-check-in system for Taoyuan International Airport was found to have machinery parts and software made by the subsidiary of a Chinese arms manufacturer, China North Industries Corporation (Norinco). The machines were built in China, but then disassembled and shipped to Taiwan. The logic controller for the system was programmed by a Japanese company, but using programming originally designed by Norinco, which further leads to concerns that there could be backdoors in this software.
Indeed, this is more broadly the concern with equipment of Chinese manufacturers that is found to be widely used in Taiwan, in that there may be Chinese backdoors. The same year, there was increased scrutiny on the widespread use of Hikvision security cameras in Taiwan. Hikvision is a Chinese brand, and there were fears regarding Hikvision routing footage through Chinese servers. It was found that 1,089 Hikvision cameras were in use at 309 schools or agencies.
At the time, this pointed to a larger issue. A report by the Executive Yuan in May 2021 found that 19,256 devices made in China were used in 2,596 schools, local governments, and other institutions. 1,848 cameras or drones made by Da-Jiang Innovations Technology were used by 717 universities, and 1,632 computer networking systems were used by TP-Link Technologies. Some schools refused to remove the cameras after being informed of the issue.
In 2024, controversy broke out after banned Chinese-made parts were reported as being used at a number of army bases, in that renewable energy initiatives on bases used Chinese telecommunications devices. This included computer control systems, power inverters, and routers, which TPP legislator Huang Kuo-chang–who publicized the claims–stated were in use at the Hungchailin Army Base, National Defense University, and Naval Fleet Command. Huang framed his criticisms as showing that the pan-Green camp’s “national team” for renewable energy had allowed for Chinese United Front efforts.
Not long afterward, KMT legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin publicized that military vehicles, including for generals, used dashboard cameras manufactured in China. 800 dashcams were removed after the probe.
It can be seen, then, that the use of Chinese equipment in sensitive facilities and institutions in Taiwan continues to be a recurrent issue. At a time when Taiwan has placed great emphasis on supply chains that avoid China, and suggested to the Western world that it could be a technology hub for supply chains that avoid the use of Chinese parts on sensitive issues, this proves another incident that undermines such efforts.