Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Jiang/WikiCommons/CC BY-SA 3.0
A RECENT ARGUMENT between Presidential Office secretary-general Pan Meng-an and KMT legislator Weng Hsiao-ling in the legislature reminds of how Taiwan’s constitutional crisis continues.
Namely, the Constitutional Court still remains frozen, due to the KMT refusing to confirm any candidates named by President Lai Ching-te. The KMT, using its slight majority in the legislature along with its ally the TPP, had previously passed legislation that prevents the Constitutional Court from making interpretations without ten justices on the bench. Subsequently, in blocking any nominations, the Constitutional Court cannot currently operate.
The KMT has adopted the same tactic of passing legislation requiring a minimum number of members for a government institution to operate, then refusing to approve any of the Lai administration’s nominees on many occasions. Other examples include the National Communications Commission (NCC), as well as the Control Yuan, as a result of which both entities are unable to function–this despite the fact that the Control Yuan is another branch of government in Taiwan’s five-fold division of powers.
More broadly, the KMT has sought to expand legislative power, as the only branch of government that they control, while minimizing the power of other branches of government. As such, the KMT has sought to pry powers away from the executive and judicial branches of government in past years. In 2024, the series of events that led to the outbreak of the Bluebird Movement–the largest social movement in Taiwan in the decade since the 2014 Sunflower Movement–was prompted by the legislature seeking to appropriate powers of investigation from the executive and judiciary. This prompted fears of resurgent authoritarianism, in that these powers could be used by the KMT-controlled legislature to target political opponents in a manner that circumvents the judiciary.
The budget cuts pushed for by the KMT in 2025–in what were the largest set of budget cuts in Taiwanese history–can also be seen as an attempt by the legislature to pry powers of budgeting from the executive branch. By law, the legislature has the ability to review the budget, but not to draw it up.
Likewise, the KMT has called for the NCC to be placed under legislative control, by appointments occurring proportionally based on the representation of the legislature. This would be an attempt to pry media regulatory powers from the executive branch of government. And in calling for the revival of the Special Investigative Division, which was used by the KMT to target political enemies during authoritarian times, this would be a further attempt by the KMT to pry policing powers from the judiciary. Moves to change maritime authority were also an attempt to shift powers to designate restricted waters from the military to KMT-controlled local governments.
Though the Constitutional Court made moves at unfreezing itself and resumed some activity, a split among the Grand Justices means that the Constitutional Court is still not operational, with the justices dissenting from the court’s unfreezing itself instead calling for a political solution to the issue.
Another response by the DPP, however, has been Premier Cho Jung-tai refusing to countersign bills passed by the Legislative Yuan. This had never previously occurred in Taiwanese history. Cho’s actions would be appropriating a power of veto for the Executive Yuan that previously did not exist. At this point, Cho has refused to sign several bills passed by the legislature.
As ousting Cho from his new power would require a constitutional interpretation, Cho’s actions would be a high-stakes dare by the DPP directed at the KMT, calling on it to unfreeze the Constitutional Court. So long as the KMT continues to block appointments by Lai, the Executive Yuan will continue to exercise this new veto power. Otherwise, if the legislature files a motion of no-confidence in Cho, Lai Ching-te, as president, has the authority to dissolve the legislature and call for a new set of elections. But this solution is not one that the KMT or its ally, the TPP, would like, in that this is a risky move if it cannot win the new set of elections. And so, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court remains frozen.