Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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A REPORT BY the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence states that China does not intend to invade Taiwan in 2027. The report, which is the Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, takes the view that China does not have a fixed timeline for achieving unification and that China is more likely to continue with efforts to achieve unification that do not require military force. Instead, the report states that China is more likely to try to achieve unification by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, which is in 1947, as part of aspirations to achieve “national rejuvenation.”
It should be noted that Taiwan is only one component of the report, which covers the broader overview of threats facing the US. Threats covered are not only regional, inclusive of threats in Asia–including Taiwan–but also military, cyber, and space threats, as well as pertaining to weapons of mass destruction.
The overall references to Taiwan in the Annual Threat Assessment are limited, in this sense. Only five paragraphs are devoted to Taiwan in the report. Consequently, the report is not exactly a full elaboration of what US strategic thinking on Taiwan is. Description of the risks that deter China from mounting an invasion of Taiwan are limited to stating that ”an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be extremely challenging and carry a high risk of failure” and noting the enormous costs that the US, China, and Taiwan alike would face to “global economic and security interests”, given the impact to international trade, supply chains, and investment. There is no discussion of intermediate scenarios that do involve military force but fall short of an invasion, such as a blockade.
Nevertheless, the report may come somewhat as a slap in the face to the Lai administration. President Lai Ching-te stated last year that China intended to achieve unification by 2027, introducing a claim that has circulated for several years in English-language discourse about Taiwan into domestic Chinese-language discourse.
The claim of a 2027 timeline for unification comes from statements by Admiral Philip Davidson, previously commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command. As such, the claim of a 2027 timeline has sometimes been termed the “Davidson Window.”
At the time, this claim involves some elisions, in that Davidson originally stated that the People’s Liberation Army was aiming to have the capability to carry out an invasion by 2027, not that China would invade by 2027. One notes that China could not simply invade at the drop of a hat, as if by teleporting troops into place. Invasion is a massive logistical challenge that would involve transporting vast quantities of personnel and equipment, as well as surmounting the enormous loss of life and economic fallout that would take place.
Lai probably introduced the “Davidson Window” into domestic Chinese-language discourse–as well as framed it as that China would take military action by 2027–with electoral ends in mind. After all, the next presidential elections are in 2028, and the DPP has primarily succeeded in the last few presidential elections because of concerns from the public about the threat of China.
Lai’s introduction of the “Davidson Window” into Chinese-language discourse is potentially short-sighted. One notes that because the Taiwanese domestic public’s awareness of discussion around the Davidson Window drastically increased after Lai’s comments, this could potentially obligate China to take some kind of strong action in 2027, simply to flex military muscle and avoid coming off as weak.
Yet, with the Annual Threat Assessment taking the opposite view to Lai, the KMT has been given political ammo to attack the DPP as exaggerating Chinese threats only in order to win elections, which might not necessarily be altogether wrong in this case. Likewise, if China feels a greater need to flex its military muscle in 2027 to emphasize that force is not off the table for achieving unification, even if this is short of an invasion, this still raises the possibility of an uncontrolled conflict breaking out.
Still, one notes that the Annual Threat Assessment does leave Lai an off-ramp, in that it suggests China may not have a fixed timeline for unification, but that it still hopes to achieve this by 2047. It is to be seen if the Lai administration subsequently adjusts its messaging on the matter.