Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: 中国新闻社/WikiCommons/CC BY 3.0
IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE, earlier this month, the Chinese government made an offer of energy security to Taiwan in return for giving up sovereignty and agreeing to Chinese rule. This was, of course, immediately turned down by the Lai administration, given that this would mean agreeing to annexation.
It may not be surprising that the move was immediately declined. China itself likely had no expectations about Taiwan agreeing, particularly with the Lai administration in power.
At the same time, this is one of the rare times that China has made a direct deal to Taiwan in terms of agreeing to annexation. In the past decade, China does not appear to have made any other formal offer to Taiwan in terms of a deal for annexation, except for periodic reminders by Chinese president Xi Jinping that “One Country, Two Systems” is still the CCP’s preferred framework for unification.
That China still maintains “One Country, Two Systems” as its preferred framework for unification in itself is somewhat surprising. “One Country, Two Systems” has become a toxic brand in Taiwan in recent years, especially in the wake of the 2019 Hong Kong protests.
Backlash against it was such that the KMT was at odds to distinguish its 1992 Consensus from “One Country, Two Systems”, with 2020 KMT presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu openly denouncing “One Country, Two Systems” while still advocating for the 1992 Consensus and insisting that the two are separate.
China making this offer, then, would be to play on the insecurities that Taiwan has after the outbreak of hostilities between the US and Iran, particularly regarding energy scarcity. Energy scarcity is a matter of concern for Taiwan after the conflict because of its reliance on importing liquified natural gas (LNG), even if the Lai administration claims that supplies are sufficient and that Taiwan has continued to be able to negotiate the acquisition of shipments of LNG.
Indeed, Taiwan’s limited energy supply is increasingly discussed vis-à-vis military contingencies in which China attacks. Taiwan would have to survive on a limited energy supply if there is a blockade of Taiwan by China or if China launches a full-scale amphibious assault.
It may be noteworthy that China made this offer to Taiwan, however, given that it is rather unusual. China may perceive Taiwan as significantly unsettled by the conflict between the US and Iran. Coverage of the conflict has been non-stop in the domestic news ecosystem.
It appears that concerns about Taiwan’s energy supply may accelerate the rebalance toward nuclear power, with the DPP compromising on its historic opposition to nuclear energy. When questioned by KMT lawmakers if there were plans for a nuclear restart after the start of hostilities in the Middle East, Lai administration officials have denied that there were, stressing that Taiwan’s energy supply is sufficient.
At the same time, in the days since, the Lai administration has stated that plans to restart reactors No. 2 and No. 3 are underway. The Lai administration was probably not driven to restart the reactors due to the current energy crisis, but because of growing international concerns about Taiwan’s energy supply in the event of an invasion, as well as whether Taiwan has stable energy supply to continue to fuel the AI boom without nuclear energy. The Lai administration has thus emphasized that these are not emergency restarts driven by the Iran War, but will follow established recommissioning procedure for restarts.
Both domestically and internationally, there seems to be a profound lack of awareness of the limited role that nuclear energy played in Taiwan’s energy mix before its phasing out. In 2023, nuclear energy only constituted 6% of Taiwan’s energy mix. But it is true that the Lai administration probably also needs to shore up domestic sentiment that Taiwan will, in fact, have a stable energy supply in wartime to prevent the spread of views that resistance against China is futile and Taiwan is best served negotiating now and coming to terms with China, rather than later.