Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Ministry of National Defense/Twitter
CHINA’S AIR INCURSIONS dropped to zero earlier this month for close to a two-week period, leading to questions as to why that had taken place. Reflective of the media discourse of today, in which hot takes prevail, there was immediately a large wave of rampant speculation on the Internet. Chinese air incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone–the airspace in which aircraft identify themselves for security purposes–have increased to a near-daily basis since the August 2022 visit to Taiwan by then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi.
Some speculation was that the Chinese military was cautious after the US and Israel opened hostilities with Iran, hence the desire to reduce Chinese air incursions to avoid being provocative. Still other speculation opined, however, that the Chinese military was attempting to reduce fuel consumption because of the impact of the war in Iran on global oil supply. Flying jet planes, after all, are notoriously fuel-intensive.
Other speculation linked the decline in air incursions to the purge of high-ranking People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generals conducted by Chinese President Xi Jinping. It is as yet unclear why Xi purged long-time associates, though this further centralizes military power in his hands. Claims that have circulated on social media, with little basis, suggest that Xi may have attempted to purge individuals who were hesitant about conducting military action against Taiwan and that he sought to remove opposition. If there is a decline in Chinese military activity, this was linked with the leadership vacuum in the PLA after Xi’s purges.
But some takes took precisely the opposite approach, in arguing that the decline in military activity was to prepare for imminent military action against Taiwan. It is increasingly discussed as to whether China will take military action in 2027, previously framed as the date by which China would have the capability to launch a military action against Taiwan–not that it necessarily would. Still further views ventured into outright speculation, suggesting that the lack of air incursions was to prevent defections–an unusual take, considering that Taiwan has not seen military defections–such as occurred during the Cold War-in past years.
More reasonably, it was eventually pointed out that Chinese military activity tends to decline around the time of the Two Sessions, which are major Chinese governmental meetings for the party and state. Yet perhaps the divided reactions to the decline in military activity point to the danger of today’s media discourse, in which commentators are quick to offer hot takes, rather than measured responses or acknowledging lack of clarity. Such commentary proves dangerous, in leading to alarmism that may ultimately raise the likelihood of conflict. It can be expected that there will be a further wave of hot takes as we approach 2027.
To this extent, it proves of note that Taiwanese military officials have stated that it is a mistake to evaluate China’s military activity only through the lens of air incursions, warning that maritime activity by the PLA has continued during this time. Moreover, although we know of Chinese air incursions because this information is regularly disseminated by the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense. There may be other forms of Chinese military activity that we simply are not aware of or do not have access to information about.
A telling example is when it was reported in January that thousands of Chinese civilian vessels had amassed over Christmas to practice apparent formations. It is thought that this massing of vessels was to test maritime capacities for integrating civilian vessels into a maritime militia that could potentially be deployed against Taiwan. This information was not disclosed by any military until reported on by the New York Times. It is unclear what Chinese military activity is simply not reported on, simply because civilians do not have access to such information.