Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Huang Kuo-chang/Facebook
THE TPP CONTINUES with its delicate balancing act on defense. In particular, the TPP seems to still be aiming to differentiate its political stance from that of the KMT, while still maintaining a pan-Blue political orientation and, in this way, taking an active stance against passing defense spending.
The TPP previously aligned with the KMT to vote down defense spending, even in the midst of Chinese military exercises that took place around Taiwan during the new year. Likewise, the TPP aligned with the KMT on controversial budget cuts that cut 1/3rd of the Taiwanese government’s operational budget last year, including defense. This led to blowback, given that US President Donald Trump had threatened to suspend support for Taiwan if defense spending was not increased to 5% or even as high as 10%.
As pressure on the pan-Blue camp built, the TPP eventually began to claim that it would pass its own version of the defense spending. This led to several controversies.
First, TPP chair Huang Kuo-chang was accused of taking classified materials from the budget out of the meeting room in order to photograph them. Huang was accused of seeking to lift the document to allow the TPP to copy figures, so as to create its own version of the bill.
Subsequently, when the TPP’s version of the defense procurement bill was finally released, it was accused by DPP legislators as Puma Shen of being unprofessional and haphazardly written. For example, 70% of defense spending was still cut, and arms purchases were limited to 82 HIMARS multiple rocket launcher systems, 60 M109A self-propelled howitzers, 70 Javelin anti-tank missile systems, 24 TOW-2B anti-tank missile systems, as well as missile-firing drones. The Ministry of National Defense later weighed in on the matter, stating that the TPP’s version of defense procurement did not include a budget for maintenance and storage of purchased equipment.
After mounting pressure, including an open letter written by 37 US elected representatives calling for the passage of the defense budget, the KMT agreed to put defense spending on the legislative agenda. The KMT also now claims that it will come up with its own version of the defense spending bill.
The TPP, however, has seized upon reports that US Donald Trump has postponed a second arms sale to Taiwan ahead of a planned meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The TPP claims that it will only pass defense spending if the US announces this second arms sale.
The TPP has framed itself as out to defend Taiwan’s interests through such actions, shrugging off external US pressure, including the open letter and criticisms from American diplomatic officials in Taiwan, such as American Institute in Taiwan director Raymond Greene. However, it is probable that the TPP is seeking to present itself as out to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty in a way that the KMT may not be, while still seeking to block defense spending. In taking advantage of the Trump administration’s flip-flops on defense spending, the TPP would also be leaning into the US-skeptic political narratives that have been embraced by the KMT in past years.
Indeed, this was how the TPP acted during tariff negotiations with the US conducted by the Lai administration. The TPP dispatched party chair Huang Kuo-chang to the US as part of what were framed as trade talks intended to prevent the DPP from coming to an agreement with the US that might not ultimately be in Taiwan’s favor.
Shortly after, the KMT announced its own version of the arms purchase bill, which aimed to reduce defense spending to 350 billion NTD–down from the 400 billion NTD in the TPP’s version–and also restricted purchases of weapons systems. It is to be seen how the TPP relates to the KMT’s version of the arms purchases.
Either way, such moves from the TPP are largely aligned with how the pan-Blue camp has framed any form of trade or military agreement between Taiwan and the US. That is, the TPP has also leaned into US-skeptic narratives in order to shore up its credibility as defending Taiwan’s sovereignty and, in this way, being more moderate than the KMT on cross-strait issues even as it largely aligns with the KMT on other issues. After all, party founder Ko Wen-je and current party chair Huang Kuo-chang are individuals who entered politics in the wake of the 2014 Sunflower Movement, originally as pan-Green political figures before shifting to the pan-Blue camp.