Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Molly Riley/The White House/Public Domain
WITH THE US Supreme Court striking down tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump, it is to be seen what happens next for Taiwan.
Not long before, the Lai administration had successfully negotiated the lowering of tariffs from the US imposed on Taiwan from 20% to 15%. The Lai administration was set to frame this as a political accomplishment.
In turn, the KMT and its ally, the TPP, took aim at the tariff negotiations. Suggestions from both parties were that the Lai administration had compromised Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield”–the world’s dependency on Taiwanese semiconductors, leading to concern over Taiwan’s security–in the course of negotiations with the US. Likewise, concerns were raised about the impact on Taiwanese farmers from the opening up of the Taiwanese market to certain US agricultural products.
The KMT and TPP had stated that they intended to review the terms of the trade agreement with the US before ratifying it. By contrast, the Lai administration urged the swift passage of the trade agreement.
Now, with Trump turning to other means of imposing tariffs after the Supreme Court ruling, fears are that Trump could turn toward trade investigations of countries. Taiwan could, for example, face an investigation under Section 301, which allows for countries to be investigated for unfair practices.
Indeed, Taiwan had long been accused by Trump of stealing the US semiconductor industry. Moreover, allegations that Taiwan is a currency manipulator are increasingly widely discussed, even if they are not exactly new.
Taiwan is not likely to be a particular target of ire by Trump, though it at times unpredictably faces Trump’s hostility. Yet this latest shift in US policy is likely to give the KMT ammunition in the political narrative that they have increasingly embraced regarding the view that the US is an unreliable ally that could potentially throw Taiwan under the bus–the Trump administration’s frequent shifts in policy lend itself to such a view. In the same timeframe, in spite of pressure from the Trump administration and from US elected officials for Taiwan to increase military expenditures, the KMT and TPP have sought to block or drastically reduce Taiwan’s defense spending. Furthermore, the DPP’s attempt to tout its successes in tariff negotiations will be undercut if tariffs as a whole are stuck down.
Nevertheless, that the US Supreme Court struck down the tariffs proves ironic in consideration of the fact that Taiwan’s Constitutional Court is still largely frozen due to legislation passed by the KMT. Over the past few years, the KMT has sought to expand legislative powers, as the only branch of government it controls, while reducing the power of the executive and judiciary branches of government. Although the court has made moves at unfreezing itself, it is to be seen if this is successful.
Although this weakens the system of checks and balances in Taiwan, the KMT has sought this approach in order to maximize its political power. And so while the systems of checks and balances still have some effect in the US, in limiting the power of the executive branch, this is not the case in Taiwan due to the KMT’s actions.
Still, the Lai administration’s inability to mobilize the public over the KMT’s actions in paralyzing branches of government that could potentially challenge it reflects that Taiwanese society at large has a poor understanding of the system of checks and balances in the setup of Taiwan’s political system. It is to be seen if the Lai administration would use the Supreme Court ruling, putting the US Supreme Court in the news cycle, in order to draw attention to the KMT’s actions in freezing Taiwan’s Constitutional Court.