Tom Wilsonby Tom Wilson
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Photo Credit: Asia Citizen Future Association/Facebook
NOT ONLY ARE the threats against civic space in Southeast Asia becoming more sophisticated–the dynamics of how civil society works across the region are changing too. These were the overriding messages from the third annual Civic Space Forum, which the Asia Citizen Future Association (ACFA) held in Taipei in November 2025.
Protecting civic space means making sure people can organise, express their views, and hold governments accountable without fear of punishment. Last year’s forum aimed to deepen conversations between civil society workers from countries including Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, along with their Taiwanese counterparts, about what can be done to safeguard civic space in the region–and the role Taiwan could potentially take to support this work.
A Region Under Strain
THE FORUM PAINTED a picture of increasing pressure and constraint. In many parts of Southeast Asia, the human rights environment is becoming more unpredictable. Countries that, over the past decade, had deposed authoritarian leaders or started a process of democratic reform are again turning to restrictive and punitive measures to control dissent.
Speakers pointed to a trend that academic Javier Corrales has described as “autocratic legalism”: The use of judicial mechanisms, rather than overt military repression, to consolidate power and suppress criticism. In the Philippines, anti-terror legislation is being used to target NGOs and human rights defenders. In Thailand, the Constitutional Court recently dissolved the opposition Move Forward Party, citing its members’ advocacy for reforming the country’s lèse-majesté law. Indonesia’s new criminal code, which came into effect this month, criminalises “insults against the state”–taking inspiration, one speaker suggested, from Thailand’s own laws.
These shifts are making democratic systems more fragile. Very few Southeast Asian countries provide robust legal protections for human rights defenders. In many cases, state and judicial institutions are becoming less reliable and more dangerous for these workers, forcing organisations like FORUM-ASIA to rewrite their safety plans and reconsider locations they had previously viewed as safe havens. This is changing the geography of human rights work in the region. Ten years ago, Hong Kong and Bangkok were de facto hubs for NGOs and activists from across Southeast Asia, offering spaces for coordination, respite and some stability. Those cities may no longer be safe bases for such work today.
Taiwan’s Capacity and Limitations
IN THE FACE of these changes, the forum asked another question: Can Taiwan fill this gap as a hub for Southeast Asian civil society organisations?
In many ways, Taiwan appears to be a natural candidate. It is geographically close, its democratic system is relatively open and fair, and its modern human rights record is broadly respected. In CIVICUS’ 2025 State of Civil Society Report, Taiwan was one of only two Asian countries to receive an ‘open’ rating. Although it is not a member of the UN, Taiwan has domestically ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Given Taiwan’s own history of martial law, its citizens and institutions may also more easily understand the pressures Southeast Asian human rights defenders face.
But there are challenges to Taiwan taking on a more formal role. ACFA’s research has previously identified structural barriers: restrictive laws controlling the registration of NGOs, especially those operated by non-Taiwanese citizens; lengthy bureaucratic procedures that can discourage or delay new organisations from operating; and the absence of a dedicated legal framework for taking in asylum seekers or protecting human rights defenders. These systems can place strain and extra costs even on Taiwanese NGOs.
Taiwan’s national security environment is another factor. The ongoing possibility of Chinese military intervention raises unavoidable questions about whether Taiwan can be seen as a safe destination for civil society actors in the long term. In practice, this means that regional human rights issues will often be refracted through the lens of security: as issues to be weighed against, or justified in terms of, Taiwan’s own national defence priorities. The risk, of course, is that over time this gives legitimacy to the kinds of civil society work which fit neatly into a security frame, while sidelining those which do not.
The forum did not resolve these questions, but it did reveal differences in how risk is understood. For human rights workers in many Southeast Asian countries, the threats are immediate and personal: arrest, detention, surveillance, even forced disappearance. As ACFA director Leah Lin noted during the conference, geopolitical pressures in Taiwan can feel more abstract or distant by comparison. These kinds of differences in risk perception need to be named openly: otherwise, alliances can fall apart when put to the test.
Collaborating in the Face of Risk
THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL constraints on Taiwan actively supporting Southeast Asian civil society groups are deep-rooted, and they may take a long time to shift. In the meantime, what can be done to continue deepening these relationships?
In my mind, the answer lies in translation. Work is needed to translate across different contexts, risk environments, and frames of reference. This work is slow and can be difficult to measure, but it is necessary.
The forum shone a light on where this work is already being done. Many panellists talked about how, in the absence of reliable national or regional human rights mechanisms, their organisations are investing in more informal ways of working. One example is the Thai advocacy group iLaw, who in 2023 mobilised over 100,000 citizens to independently observe Thailand’s general election. The same year, iLaw gathered more than 200,000 signatures calling for constitutional reform, despite significant state resistance. The organisation attributes these successes to its decision to resource and empower local associations to activate their own networks.
This takes bravery and patience. I’ve seen in my own country, Aotearoa New Zealand, that trusting community organisations to take the lead can have positive results–but only when they have access to the resourcing and infrastructure they need to succeed.
These ways of working have a history in Taiwan too. Much of Taiwan’s contemporary civil society infrastructure grew out of the relational and decentralised practices developed in the Sunflower Movement and later civic tech initiatives. Even in 2024, the brief but large-scale ‘Bluebird’ protests proved the enduring power of grassroots mobilisation.
In other words, Taiwanese and Southeast Asian civil societies are already working in similar modes. The next challenge will be to find new ways to bring these together.
The Civic Space Forum revealed one important point of connection. It was refreshing to hear the voice of migrant-focused advocacy groups such as Migrante Taiwan in the room. These organisations not only play an important role in helping largely Southeast Asian migrant workers to navigate Taiwan’s official systems and processes, but over time may help to shift political will too. In a regional environment that is increasingly under all kinds of strain, these kinds of bridges may turn out to be among the most important.