Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: 人民民主黨/Facebook
AUTUMN STRUGGLE, historically one of Taiwan’s two major annual labor protests alongside May Day, took place late last month on November 30th. In recent years, however, Autumn Struggle has become known for its drift toward the KMT, as reflective of the influence of the pro-unification left within Taiwanese labor circles. This was again the case this year, with KMT chair Cheng Li-wun making an appearance at Autumn Struggle.
In particular, the demonstration began outside the legislature, proceeded north past Taipei Main Station, and finished outside the Presidential Office Building on Ketagalan Boulevard. The theme of the rally was “Oppose lies, seek truth! Oppose war, seek survival!” Participant groups included the Labor Party, the People’s Democratic Party, the New Party, the RCA Association, and TAVOI.
Specifically, while Autumn Struggle traditionally was focused on calling for an improvement in the labor conditions of workers, in past years, Autumn Struggle has become more focused on cross-strait relations. As such, Autumn Struggle’s primary demand this year was against US weapons sales to Taiwan, which were framed as an exorbitant waste of money that could instead go to workers’ livelihoods, with the suggestion that Taiwan could not defend itself even with the arms that the US sold it, and so such arms purchases were a waste.
Indeed, Autumn Struggle largely followed the KMT’s framing, in depicting the US as foisting useless weapons onto Taiwan in order to profit. To this extent, the Lai administration was framed as provoking China with its actions. The Lai administration was instead called on to revive cross-strait trade with China. That Autumn Struggle has veered directly into a pro-unification stance at present was visible in that participants directly chanted slogans and gave speeches calling for the peaceful reunification of Taiwan and China.
More directly pertaining to labor, Autumn Struggle organizers called for a sustainable pension system, protections for delivery workers. The government was called on to do more for workers affected by tariff shocks from the US, as well as to end discriminatory practices against migrant workers. Yet such demands were sidelined in many ways by the emphasis on cross-strait relations of the rally.
It has been over half a decade since Autumn Struggle’s turn toward the KMT. Notably, Autumn Struggle was not held in the lead-up to 2020 elections in 2019, apparently due to internal disputes about what stance should be taken vis-a-vis the DPP and KMT.
Then, in 2020, Autumn Struggle saw mass participation by KMT members, primarily deep Blue individuals who had been supporters of Han Kuo-yu during the 2020 elections. Instead of focusing on a labor demand, Autumn Struggle switched its focus to that of US pork imports.
Likewise, the 2020 Autumn Struggle saw participation of KMT politicians including then-KMT chair Johnny Chiang, former President Ma Ying-jeou, and then-chair Eric Chu.
The event was flooded with KMT supporters and members of the pan-Blue camp. That this occurred was an odd contrast for a labor rally that had traditionally positioned itself as independent of both the pan-Blue and pan-Green camps.
The next year, in 2021, Autumn Struggle framed its main demand as against “dictatorship.” This framing suggested that the Autumn Struggle took the view that the DPP had enacted a dictatorship in Taiwan, as the KMT has sometimes claimed.
Since its pivot to the KMT, Autumn Struggle has notably declined in attendance, with only a few hundred in attendance each year. This proves a contrast for a labor rally that traditionally drew tens of thousands of participants.
So, too, with this year, which only drew several hundred participants. Cheng’s participation in the rally again shows how Autumn Struggle has aligned itself with the KMT. However, notably, Cheng remained silent during a speech calling for peaceful reunification–apparently a step too far for a KMT leader who has otherwise caused controversy with a number of her public comments. Cheng has, in recent memory, stated that Ukraine provoked Russia into attacking through becoming too close to NATO, that Russian president Vladimir Putin is a democratically elected leader, that she hoped to see Taiwanese proud to be Chinese, and appeared at events to commemorate executed CCP spies. It may be that Cheng is still strategically ambiguous when it comes to direct expressions of support for unification.