Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Lu Shiow-yen/Facebook
THE AFTERMATH of the recalls is gradually taking shape.
In particular, the pan-Blue camp is likely to persist with further attempts to attack the DPP. A new proposal from the TPP, which is supported by the KMT, would tie national referendums to elections. This would likely drive up turnout in a way that would make it more likely that referendums would meet benchmarks to be binding.
It was historically a demand of the pan-Green camp that benchmarks to hold national referendums in Taiwan be lowered. The pan-Green camp historically viewed referendums as a means to directly call on the public to vote on key issues, such as Taiwan’s sovereignty or nuclear energy.
That the benchmarks to hold referendums were lowered, resulting in the current situation in which Taiwan has seen a number of national referendums in the past decade, occurred because of the DPP. However, when the DPP found that the KMT could leverage on referendums quite effectively to drive up support for its candidates in 2018, the DPP changed laws so that referendums would not need to take place on the same day as elections.
As the move to tie referendums back to elections is pushed for by TPP chair Huang Kuo-chang, one notes that Huang has termed the current laws a “birdcage” on the Referendum Act. This was the framing used by the pan-Green camp when they originally called for lowering benchmarks for referendums to be held and be binding.
It proves ironic for the pan-Blue camp to embrace referendums while claiming that the recalls against KMT legislators violated democratic institutions. Both recalls and referendums are enshrined in the ROC constitution. Still, it is clear that the KMT finds referendums advantageous and fears recalls.
After the recalls, the KMT also intends to reverse the Tsai administration’s cuts to pensions for public servants, teachers, police, firefighters, and members of the military. This is another typical move for the KMT, in seeking to appeal to a traditional demographic that supported the party.
In the meantime, internal splits are evident in both the KMT and DPP alike after the recall, even if the KMT is seen as having come out on top. Namely, the question of who will be the KMT’s next party chair is now up in the air. Current party chair Eric Chu has stated that he is willing to step aside for Lu Shiow-yen, who is a frontrunner for the KMT’s 2028 presidential candidate.
However, Lu has stated that she does not intend to run for the position. Though Lu’s standing as a presidential candidate could be strengthened by being party chair. Lu may be concerned about being weakened if the KMT does badly in the 2026 local elections and she is forced to resign as party chair to take responsibility.
Former president Tsai Ing-wen made a public appearance along with President Lai Ching-te and Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim in a show of party unity. But a number of DPP caucus leaders, including secretary-general Rosalia Wu, have stated that they intend to resign their leadership positions. This appears to be a move aimed at pressuring DPP legislative caucus leader Ker Chien-ming to resign.
Ker has held power for close to a quarter-decade as DPP legislative caucus leader. Yet Ker is not a popular figure, particularly with young people, who see him as an emblem of how the DPP strayed too close to political corruption during the Chen Shui-bian period.
Ker is also seen as having pushed the DPP toward the political strategy of recalls, while failing to manage relationships with civil society groups that were the actual organizers of recalls, in attempting to claim the political credit of the recalls. It is probable that Ker pushed for the DPP’s embrace of the recalls as a means of signaling his power to President Lai Ching-te, who also seems to wish to restrain Ker’s power.
Shake-ups seem likely in both parties, then. Perhaps what the recalls accomplished–even if no KMT legislators were recalled, they have served to elevate the stakes of Taiwanese politics.