Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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A RECENT SUBSTACK post by Christian Whiton, an advisor to the Bush and Trump administrations, proves an odd fever dream about Taiwan. Even if not framed in such terms, the gist of Whiton’s argument about Taiwan is, in effect, that the Trump administration’s recent actions directed toward Taiwan are driven by a lack of faith in Taiwan because of its embrace of the woke Left.
Specifically, Whiton’s argument centers around the Trump administration’s decision to impose a 20% tariff rate on Taiwan and its cancellation of a planned stopover in the US by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te. Indeed, there is no reason exactly to absolve the Trump administration of throwing Taiwan under the bus here. It is true that the Trump administration’s actions do suggest that it can unpredictably slap Taiwan in the face to try and please China, as its actions show. However, it is far more probable that the Trump administration was acting on larger strategic priorities–which put American economic extraction from Taiwan and avoiding upsetting China during trade negotiations as its first priority–rather than any specific animus toward Taiwan for being “woke”.
One notes, for example, that other countries in the Asia Pacific saw similar tariff rates imposed by the Trump administration. Cambodia and Thailand saw 19%, while South Korea and Japan saw 15% tariff rates. There is no reason to suspect particular animus because of a 20% tariff rate that only differs by a mere few percentage points. But the apparent lack of logic behind the Trump administration’s tariff rates has led some to suspect that they were arrived at through the use of AI, and so there probably is no need to overanalyze.
Whiton seems to have a particular fixation on Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s former representative to the US. For one, Whiton lashes out at a Politico article written about Hsiao, arguing that Hsiao was among the most influential diplomats in DC, seeming to think that this is a claim by the Taiwanese government about itself. But Whiton takes issue with Hsiao meeting with not only associates of the Trump administration from what he terms the “New Right” but traditional members of the political establishment in DC, lashing out at the International Republican Institute and National Endowment for Democracy. In other words, Whiton seems to take issue with Hsiao for meeting with stakeholders of varied political stripes, as a diplomat might, rather than just MAGA Republicans.
At another point, Whiton attacks Hsiao for publishing in the Washington Post, which for him is a left-wing institution. Yet one notes how representatives of the Lai administration have also published, perhaps rather questionably, with frequency in the Washington Times. In another point in his article, Whiton hones in on Hsiao’s attendance at the Biden inauguration, something that was perceived as a win for Taiwan at the time because this made Hsiao the first Taiwanese representative to the US to attend a presidential inauguration since the US and Taiwan broke diplomatic ties.
In other words, Whiton’s gripes against Hsiao seem to primarily revolve around a lack of one-minded political loyalty to the MAGA camp, insofar as she represents Taiwan. Otherwise, Whiton cites several issues as to why the Trump administration may look at Taiwan with ire. These are the obstacles faced by US expats in Taiwan, such as regarding double taxation, Taiwan’s lack of defense spending, and what he claims to be the Lai administration’s beholdenness to a woke environmental agenda.
Here, Whiton seems to make his affiliations clear, in signaling alignment with members of the Trump administration who have sought to use defense spending as a pretext to drop support for Taiwan. The Trump administration has called for Taiwan to increase defense spending to 10% of the GDP, never mind that an increase to 10% would consume more money than the government has available to it–as this would consume 84% of annual spending, all social services would have to be cut in favor of defense spending, which would be political suicide for the Lai or any other administration. The Lai administration is still managing the expectations of the Trump administration when it comes to defense spending, though such claims from an administration that has haphazardly gutted US government spending and fired thousands without knowing what their jobs are, then needed to replace them when their jobs turned out to be essential, should be looked at askance for Taiwan.
It also proves an odd view that Whiton seems to think that the Lai administration is more focused on a woke environmental agenda than defense. The Lai administration has quietly shifted on the DPP’s longstanding opposition to nuclear energy, given Taiwan’s energy needs in the event of a Chinese invasion. At the same time, though anti-nuclear opposition has historically been the DPP’s stance, this is not motivated by contemporary environmentalism in the slightest, but has deep roots in the history of developmentalism in Taiwan. Still, it is to be noted that this is sometimes the view of Taiwan from MAGA types, with reports from the Heritage Foundation also lashing out at Taiwan for its perceived embrace of environmentalist social justice warrior concerns and lack of seriousness on defense.
Lastly, it proves somewhat strange for Whiton to labor under the delusion that any animus by Trump toward Taiwan is on the basis of how US nationals in Taiwan are treated. The Lai administration hopes to end double taxation, which Whiton does not credit him for, and has made efforts to make the lives of Americans in Taiwan easier. In fact, the bill to end double taxation currently still needs approval from the US Senate, and so the ball is in America’s court. But, more importantly, it is hard to imagine Trump’s policy on any nation taking into consideration the treatment of American expatriates there, except in the event of major diplomatic incidents. The Trump administration probably does not think very much about the interests of Americans abroad, if it knows that they exist at all.
Whiton’s article has gotten undue attention in Taiwan when it is taken as the view of a Washington insider, though it has also been rightly dismissed out of hand as a fringe political view. Given Whiton’s own rather insignificant role in the Trump administration, it is far from likely that Whiton’s views reflect those of the Trump administration as a whole. In this respect, the DPP probably misstepped by publicly responding to what should have been ignored. Those who have amplified Whiton’s argumentation in order to act on some partisan animus against the DPP on the basis of underlying social conservatism also illustrate their profound ignorance of American politics, in thinking the view has any significance.
This piece is, however, useful in reminding of how the MAGA strain of American politics is an increasingly deranged one, and that just as they turned on Ukraine, they are likely also to on Taiwan. The piece shows the fracture lines by which they would turn on Taiwan, then. If so, this would be justified by views utterly detached from political reality, as with Whiton’s, but there is no reasoning with the conspiratorial.