Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Brian Hioe
THE RECALLS SET to take place later this week are a historically unprecedented event in Taiwan. Recalls have never occurred in Taiwan in such a wide-ranging manner as at present. Some have taken this as a hopeful sign, in that this could lead to the recall of KMT politicians in a manner that allows for a shift in the balance of power in the legislature.
But what will take place after the recalls? Even after successful recalls, by-elections will have to be held. By-elections, too, may result in another KMT candidate simply being elected, even if the dynamics often prove different in by-elections, such that the political camp of a recalled candidate may be significantly weaker.
As such, even if the recalls are relatively successful, this does not mean that the balance of power will change in the legislature immediately. If so, this means that the dynamics of a campaign year in Taiwan will continue for some time.
What can be expected after the recall is that both political camps will put forward a new set of candidates. In particular, the DPP will probably field its top candidates, with an eye toward younger, eye-catching candidates, as well as candidates that may not have been successful in the 2024 elections but performed strongly, particularly in areas that historically slant toward the pan-Blue camp. Miao Poya, for example, will be someone to run. This, in effect, would continue the DPP’s strategy since 2014 of fielding younger candidates who are fresh faces, who have less political baggage compared to longstanding DPP politicians, in candidates that have historically slanted blue.
On the other hand, it is a question of what the KMT will do. After a successful recall, the candidate who was recalled will be unable to run again. With the KMT having largely failed to cultivate any new set of younger candidates in the way that the DPP has in past years–given declining support for the KMT to the extent that the party had less than 9,000 members under 40 a few years ago–the KMT has fewer choices to pick from. It is possible that the KMT will be forced into a position where it may have to field longstanding KMT politicians the public is tired of or a slate of relatively bland political unknowns. While the TPP could run in the KMT’s stead, potentially with its blessing, the TPP’s political brand has increasingly become indistinguishable from the KMT in the past two years due to siding with it on almost major public issue. As such, a TPP candidate would face similar challenges, particularly with party founder Ko Wen-je out of the limelight given his current jail sentence.
Indeed, the KMT generally tried to position its younger politicians as the faces of recall campaigns it organized against the DPP. This did not work well for the KMT when a number of them were investigated for signature fraud in recall petition collection or otherwise became embroiled in scandal. This could, in fact, have irreparably damaged the careers of candidates it would have otherwise hoped to run.
Nevertheless, it may also be worth examining–what happens if the recalls fail? If so, that means that the politicians who were unable to be recalled will be able to stay in power, since recalls cannot be organized again against them for some time. It is unlikely that a recall campaign would have such momentum as to immediately organize another recall, anyhow–rather, a new wave of outrage would be required for this to take place.
The KMT is not likely to take the recalls as a warning to change its pro-China image if the recalls are unsuccessful. Whether led by Fu Kun-chi or others within the party, the KMT is likely to redouble efforts to reshape Taiwan’s government system to its advantage, as well as in pursuing closer ties with China.
That is, the result of the 2024 elections showed a reversion back to the status quo, in that the KMT managed to retake the legislature. The only period in Taiwanese history in which a non-KMT political party ever held the majority in the legislature was from 2016 to 2024. But the election result led to the DPP holding power for an unprecedented third consecutive term.
This should have been a warning for the KMT. However, instead, the KMT began to act as though it had a strong mandate to reshape the system of political governance in Taiwan, carrying out actions such as seeking to expand legislative powers, freeze or cut vast sections of the budget, or freezing the Constitutional Court. This was an unwise move, leading to immediate public blowback in the form of the Bluebird Movement, and eventually in the form of the Great Recall Movement, a sign that the KMT did not have such a mandate and that such moves were divisive.
Politicians once critical of the KMT’s drift toward China, such as Hsu Chiao-hsin, have long shifted to a strong pro-China stance. Politicians who were once moderates in the party, such as Eric Chu, have also become quite hardline. In this sense, it should be visible that there is no political force in the KMT at present that would guide an attempt to change the party’s current political trajectory.
In this sense, if the recalls were to fail, one should expect more of the same from the KMT–stoking further outrage, even if directed to political ends other than a recall. It is improbable that this would not eventually coincide with some election cycle that would result in another loss for the KMT in the legislature.
This more generally fits with the short-sightedness of the KMT at present, in that the party has no long-term strategy. For example, in expanding legislative powers, if the DPP had ever again taken control of the legislature, the KMT would have gifted them an extremely powerful set of powers. Perhaps this suggests that the KMT is ultimately banking on events external to Taiwan to push a fundamental realignment of politics in their favor.