Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
語言:
English
Photo Credit: Subscriptshoe9/WikiCommons/CC BY-SA 4.0
THE CIRCULAR LINE MRT in New Taipei has been criticized over the use of Chinese-made doors, which originate from a subcontractor for the French company that builds the trains used in the MRTs.
Specifically, controversy arises from that the Nanjing Kangni Mechanical & Electrical Company was chosen to be the door supplier by Alstom, which is responsible for the trains. The doors will be used for the northern and southern sections of the Circular Line, which is still under construction.
Critics have pointed to Nanjing Kangni’s history of safety accidents, with doors opening in the New York subway in late 2019 and early 2020, leading 298 cars to be inspected for safety concerns. A similar incident occurred in Dalian in 2023, when there was a similar door-opening incident.
Yet part of the concern about Nanjing Kangni also returns to security concerns. For one, Chinese state-owned companies are major shareholders. Nanjing Institute of Technology Asset Management Company, which is state-owned, is the largest shareholder. The Diaoyutai Economic Development Company, also state-owned, is the fifth-largest shareholder.
But efforts have been made in recent years to categorize trains, such as city metro systems, Taiwan’s national railway, and the high-speed railway system, as critical infrastructure essential for national defense. The National Security Act currently does not list railways as critical infrastructure.
Indeed, under the provisions of the National Security Act, companies from China, Hong Kong, and Macau, or other hostile foreign entities, are not allowed to supply critical infrastructure for national defense. Though the contract with Alstrom also prohibits Chinese funding, it does not forbid subcontracting to Chinese companies.
Photo credit: Foxy1219/WikiCommons/CC BY-SA 4.0
This is not the only time that technology for transportation infrastructure has been found to come from Chinese companies. In 2022, the use of Chinese parts and software for the luggage self-check-in system at Taoyuan International Airport caused controversy. Machinery parts and software for the self-check-in system were made by the subsidiary of a Chinese arms manufacturer, China North Industries Corporation (Norinco).
The machines were built in China, but then disassembled and shipped to Taiwan. The logic controller for the system was programmed by a Japanese company, but using programming originally designed by Norinco, which further leads to concerns that there could be backdoors in this software.
The tender was won by a Taiwanese company, CTCI Advanced Systems Incorporated, which has responded to the controversy by emphasizing that its machines were built in Taiwan but used Chinese parts. While some criticisms were that the vetting process for public tenders was insufficient, critics otherwise saw the company as attempting to pass off Chinese products as Taiwanese ones.
The city government can review the process to reject the doors from Nanjing Kangni, though it is unclear whether it will do so, seeing as the Taipei and New Taipei city governments are both KMT-controlled. It is to be seen whether there will be any contention between central and local governments about the matter.
Either way, the case points toward how loopholes that allow for the use of Chinese parts exist at present in Taiwanese society, such as with regard to how Chinese companies can still be subcontracted. Moreover, one notes that companies seeking cheap solutions may further be incentivized toward the Chinese market, even if this may lead to safety concerns.
Still, the issue of Chinese parts is not a new one, and it is sometimes compounded by bureaucratic back-and-forth between different sections of the government, or local institutions that are reluctant to take action. A report by the Executive Yuan in May 2021 found that 19,256 devices made in China were used in 2,596 schools, local governments, and other institutions. 1,848 cameras or drones made by Da-Jiang Innovations Technology were used by 717 universities, and 1,632 computer networking systems were used by TP-Link Technologies. Some schools refused to remove the cameras after being informed of the issue.
Other times, the problem was compounded by slowness in responding on the part of the government. The Executive Yuan released guidelines on products that may pose information security risks on April 19, 2019, and was to release a list of banned Chinese products three months later. However, a ban on Chinese-made products in government only formally took place on January 1st, 2022, more than three years later.