by Brian Hioe
語言:
English
Photo Credit: ShiningStarSomalia1960/WikiCommons/Public Domain
THE SOMALI CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY has begun blocking Taiwanese passport holders from entering Somalia, citing “One China” and UN Resolution 2758. This proves an unusual move.
For one, it is to be questioned whether the move occurred at the behest of Chinese authorities, or whether it was an action undertaken by Somalia on its own, as part of a desire to please China. Either way, the move raises the possibility that countries that seek to better relations with China will seek to block Taiwanese passport holders from entering the country.
It is to be seen whether Somalia would allow Taiwanese to enter if they hold Chinese forms of national identification. Somalia’s move takes place at a time when the Taiwanese government has sought to crack down on Taiwanese who hold Chinese national ID or household registration, something that is illegal under Taiwanese law, and requires individuals to forfeit their Taiwanese nationality. Relatively few Taiwanese travel to Somalia annually.
Likewise, there was confusion in initial reports as to whether the blocking of Taiwanese passport holders was justified by Somalia on the basis of “One China Policy” or “One China Principle”. Early reports mostly referred to “One China Policy”, while later reports referred to “One China Principle.”
China adheres to the “One China Principle” with regards to its claims over Taiwan, while the US and other countries in the world have separate and distinguishable “One China Policy.” China frequently seeks to conflate the two as part of its lawfare regarding Taiwan, to frame it as though there is a universal “One China Principle” that all countries abide by.
But as “One China Policy” is more associated with the US, again, as separate from China’s “One China Principle”. As such, it was unclear from initial reporting as to whether this was journalistic confusion, confusion on the part of Somali authorities, or a deliberate attempt by China to muddy the waters.
Although Somalia at least in part aims to please China, it is also probable that Somalia may be hitting back at warming ties between Somaliland and Taiwan. Somaliland is an unrecognized territory claimed by Somalia, though it is self-administered. Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in May 1991, following the Somali Civil War. Somaliland has its own government, issues its own currency, possesses a military, and holds regular democratic elections, as well as maintains informal diplomatic relations with some of its surrounding countries.
In a surprise political development in 2020, Somaliland and Taiwan exchanged representative offices, though the two polities did not recognize each other. Taiwan and Somaliland have obvious parallels in facing territorial claims from a neighbor. At the time, the Tsai administration termed the exchange of representative offices to be a diplomatic coup, while the KMT attacked the utility of establishing ties with an unrecognized territory.
Indeed, Taiwan’s only formal diplomatic ally in Africa is Eswatini, one of the world’s last absolute monarchies. Presided over by King Mswati III, the constitution has been suspended in Eswatini for decades, while pro-democratic opposition politicians face threats, arrest, and the danger of extrajudicial reprisals in the form of political assassination. In spite of Eswatini’s checkered human rights record, Taiwan continues to back King Mswati III’s absolutist government, motivated in part at least by that the KMT would leverage criticisms against the Lai administration if Taiwan lost its last diplomatic ally in Africa.
Recent developments may suggest that China is increasingly seeking to pressure Taiwan in Africa. South Africa, for example, has begun to pressure Taiwan about moving its representative office out of the capital city of Pretoria. Though South Africa previously backed off from this push after negotiations between the Taiwanese and South African governments, South Africa may, too, be aiming to please China. South Africa later unilaterally acted to change the name of Taiwan’s representative office, a move that was condemned by the government, but may also represent a new form of diplomatic means of pressuring Taiwan.
Apart from that trade relations between China and South Africa, as both are part of the BRICS grouping, are substantial, South Africa’s actions are also probably timed as a means of testing reactions from the second Trump administration. Indeed, the US has expressed displeasure over Somalia and South Africa’s actions. But though the first Trump administration and Biden administration saw the US express displeasure about when countries broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan through the passage of legislation as the TAIPEI Act, it is less clear as to whether this will occur during the second Trump administration–and whether criticisms will be followed by any action.