by Brian Hioe
語言:
English
Photo Credit: Lai Ching-te/Facebook
TAIWANESE PRESIDENT Lai Ching-te held a press conference yesterday to warn of Chinese infiltration efforts in Taiwanese society. To this extent, Lai announced new measures from the government aimed at curbing such infiltration.
The avenues of infiltration that Lai referenced were all largely known. Lai highlighted that China had sought to influence, co-opt, or recruit retired and active-duty members of the military, entertainers and influencers, businesspeople, politicians, media, and commentators. Lai highlighted the rising number of espionage cases reported among members of the military, efforts by China to win over young entrepreneurs through offering financial incentives, to steal key technologies, and push Taiwanese entertainers working in the Chinese market to make statements framing Taiwan as part of China.
A number of Lai’s new measures were already known. Lai stated that efforts to shore up connections with the international world and convey that Taiwan is not governed by China, in spite of efforts by China to shrink Taiwan’s international space, would continue. Moreover, penalties for spying by military personnel would be increased.
With increased concern as of late about the number of Taiwanese who hold Chinese national IDs, relevant authorities would step up measures to ensure that civil servants, members of the military, and others do not hold Chinese national IDs. And efforts to increase economic opportunities for Taiwanese young people, so they are not swayed by incentives offered by China, would continue. Funding would also be allocated to cultural initiatives to curb the influence of Chinese soft power. However, the Lai administration will move ahead with plans to raise barriers to residents of Hong Kong and Macau seeking residency, even if this may raise barriers for those seeking to escape the deterioration of political freedoms there.
Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te (center). Photo credit: Lai Ching-te/Facebook
Yet some of Lai’s measures were new. Taiwan will now seek to block groups with connections to the United Front from traveling to Taiwan and with regards to cross-strait exchanges. This suggests that the Lai administration may continue to block some members of delegations of Chinese delegations that visit as part of events such as the city-based cross-strait exchanges held by the Taipei city government with Shanghai. In line with such efforts, the Lai administration will require disclosures on exchanges with China from political parties, religious groups, and other bodies.
Military courts will be brought back into use to deal with espionage cases. The suggestion had been floated in the past, particularly given concerns that civilian courts were not adequate to deal with such espionage cases, and made misinformed rulings that were too light.
Lai further stated that efforts to improve education about the threat of China in schools would be strengthened. Chinese influence through social media apps such as TikTok has been of increasing concern in past years.
It could be broadly expected that the Lai administration would seek to strengthen its current measures to deal with the rising threat of China. Lai deciding to hold a national press conference to package these new measures together adds strength to the securitization of the issue. One notes the Lai administration has become decidedly more combative as of late regarding Chinese influence, as observed in the Mainland Affairs Council openly criticizing the KMT’s actions, or the National Immigration Agency moving to invalidate the residency permit of a Chinese influencer who openly expressed support of the military annexation of Taiwan.
Yet one wonders how the Lai administration hopes to pay for some of its initiatives, given the wide-ranging budget cuts pushed for by the KMT. The KMT has, at present, sought to cut 34% of the operational funding available to the government in what are the most wide-ranging budget cuts in Taiwanese history.
And it is to be expected that the KMT will frame the Lai administration’s actions as overstepping the bounds of fundamental political freedoms. The KMT has generally sought to frame actions aimed at regulating Chinese influence in this way. It would not be unthinkable if, for example, the KMT seeks to frame Lai as seeking something like South Korea’s declaration of martial law under Yoon Suk Yeol.