by Brian Hioe
語言:
English
Photo Credit: 國防部發言人/Facebook
THE TAIWANESE NAVY recently concluded three days of drills, which are held annually before the Lunar New Year as a means of reassuring the public about its capacity to counter Chinese threats.
As part of the drills, navy vessels practiced anti-submarine operations, as well as heading off an enemy attack from the southwest of Taiwan. Tanks, armored vehicles, and helicopters were also deployed as part of drilling. Namely, the three days of drills involve all branches of the military. The Chinese military continued to conduct intrusions during this time, perhaps aimed at disrupting the drills to a limited extent.
Nevertheless, the drills attracted little notice in Taiwan, partly because of their routine nature. The drills are not among the high-profile drills that take place in Taiwan each year, such as the Han Kuang exercises.
But, more generally, the public scarcely pays attention to any kind of military drill in Taiwan, which is more the domain of experts who analyze the technical details of drills. Certainly, the lack of attention is probably for the same reason as to why the public does not react to Chinese military exercises directed at Taiwan, in that the public has grown inured to the Chinese government’s military intimidations directed at Taiwan in past decades.
Such military threats have become repetitive and mundane, rather leading to a sense of escalating threat, illustrating how the Chinese military has failed to convey a sense of threat toward the Taiwanese public. Paradoxically, this perception may also apply to how the Taiwanese military has communicated–or failed to communicate–when it attempts to show the means by which it has developed new means of countering Chinese threats. Still, there may be more attention to the military at a time when the KMT has sought to cut Taiwan’s military budget, and targeted flagship programs such as the domestic submarine program.
In the meantime, in comments of the new year and in the week after, Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te emphasized his “Four Pillars of Peace.” The “Four Pillars of Peace” emphasizes building up military capacities for deterrence, economic security, strengthening relationships with other countries, and lastly, consistent and principled cross-strait leadership.
Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te (center). Photo credit: Lai Ching-te/Facebook
Lai has drawn on the framing on several occasions, starting in 2023. The “Four Pillars of Peace” came up, too, in Lai’s inauguration address. Lai also has referenced the framing during defense conferences such as the Ketagalan Forum.
Still, there has been relatively little attention to the “Four Pillars of Peace” framing, perhaps because it is a rather bland reiteration of the Lai administration’s policy. It is generally known that the Lai administration continues the Tsai administration’s platforms in attempting to strengthen ties with other countries as a bulwark against China, strengthening military capabilities for deterrence, and boosting Taiwan’s global economic profile to ensure economic security against Chinese economic coercion. It is less clear, however, how Lai will articulate this platform at a time in which the KMT seeks to cut Taiwan’s defense spending, openly questions the utility of economic expenditure to strengthen diplomatic ties with other countries, and calls for renewed economic ties with China.
At the same time, one notes that there is a pattern of moves by the Lai administration flying under the profile of international observers. There has been little attention in Taiwan to Lai’s proposal for a “Two Four Consensus”, in bringing China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation to the table for a new set of talks intended to lead to a new cross-strait consensus. The lack of attention to this proposal occurs in spite of the fact that Lai has consistently placed unusually high-ranking DPP officials as head of the Straits Exchange Foundation to indicate the importance he places on the proposal.
Indeed, though China rejected the proposal, that Lai raised the idea–and even called for new meetings with China intended to hammer out a new cross-strait consensus–shows his willingness to dialogue with China. This willingness to dialogue can also be seen in Lai’s repeated comments that he hopes to meet with Xi Jinping. Yet opaque views of Lai’s policy still persist among some international observers, who have not updated their understanding of the DPP’s current position under Lai, and see Lai as a pro-independence provocateur based on past statements, when Lai has now spent many years positioning himself as representing continuous policy with Tsai–including of statements about “loving Taiwan while having an affinity with China” that riled his own historically pro-independence base. Such misperceptions are likely to persist.