Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: 台灣公道伯 王金平/Facebook
FORMER KMT MAJORITY speaker Wang Jinpyng recently announced a new proposal for cross-strait formula earlier this month. The new proposal suggests that while neither government on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are subordinate to each other, they share the same sovereignty.
Wang’s new cross-strait formula occurs after a series of moves that have led to speculation that he might seek the KMT party chair. For one, Wang last month announced the formation of a new think tank devoted to cross-strait relations, the Middle Way Alliance. Wang’s new cross-strait proposal was announced during a launch event for the Middle Way Alliance.
Wang was conspicuously absent from the KMT’s National Congress this year. KMT heavyweights, such as deep blue former party chair and presidential candidate Hung Hsiu-chu stated that the media should not make too much of Wang’s absence, seeing as he likely had other business, and that he was still welcome to run for chair.
Though Wang has been relatively quiet in past years, Wang had already been making moves that suggested future plans. Indeed, when the formation of the Middle Way Alliance was first announced in November, in the same month, Wang visited China on what was framed as a visit to his ancestral homeland. As part of this visit, Wang met with Chinese government officials including Taiwan Affairs Office director Song Tao. Wang probably sought approval for his new cross-strait formula during these meetings.
This is not the first trip to China by Wang in recent memory. Wang also traveled to China in June 2024 for what was framed as a religious pilgrimage. But it is noteworthy that Wang’s trip to China took place after an April trip to China by former president Ma Ying-jeou, during which he met with Chinese president Xi Jinping.
Wang was historically viewed as the leader of the comparatively pro-localization “Taiwanese” faction of the KMT. By contrast, Wang’s rival, Ma Ying-jeou, was understood to be the leader of the establishment “Mainlander” faction of the KMT.
Photo credit: 台灣公道伯 王金平/Facebook
Wang’s recent actions can, in many ways, be understood as contending with Ma for influence. Ma has continued to be a party heavyweight in the KMT, even after the end of his presidency. It is thought that the KMT’s continued adherence to the 1992 Consensus, even after successive KMT chairs such as Johnny Chiang and Eric Chu proposed dropping it and 2024 presidential candidate Hou You-yi was also initially reluctant to embrace it, is largely due to Ma’s influence in the party.
Wang’s attempt to coin a new cross-strait formula, as well as his visit to China, may be an attempt to angle for Chinese support. To begin with, the trips are in imitation of Ma’s own visit to China, a major driver for which is probably for Ma to maintain his standing in the KMT relative to those that would otherwise contend with for influence by emphasizing that he has the backing of the Chinese government.
Indeed, the KMT has historically campaigned with the claim that it is the only political party in Taiwan able to communicate with the CCP and, in this way, it is the only party able to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. The KMT has used this claim to justify to voters why it alone should be allowed to hold power in Taiwan. Ironically, holding political leadership in the KMT also seems to be dependent on emphasizing one’s ability to communicate with the CCP, and to be backed by the CCP.
Current party chair Eric Chu seems to have largely been marginalized by Ma within the party when it comes to influencing the KMT’s most important political position–that on cross-strait relations. Wang would seem to be trying to make a bid for replacing Ma, then, in securing the backing of the CCP for his cross-strait formula to oust Ma.
Wang may be seeking to moderate himself, in that Lai Ching-te has emphasized on several occasions that neither side of the Taiwan Strait is subordinate to the other, a formula for cross-strait relations that the KMT has framed as dangerously pro-independence. In this sense, Wang’s notion of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait having governments that are not subordinate to each other may be a compromise to the DPP.
Still, even if Wang was seen as comparatively pro-localization a decade prior, times have changed. In order to secure China’s backing, Wang would have to ensure a guarantee of “One China.” Hence his claim that Taiwan and China share the same sovereignty, a view that may not be “One China” but still suggests an inalienable bond between Taiwan and China. Perhaps his new formula is, then, simply a rehash of the 1992 Consensus aimed at challenging Ma for de facto leadership of the KMT.