by Brian Hioe

語言:
English
Photo Credit: Mil.ru/WikiCommons/CC BY 4.0

CHINA HAS DEPLOYED a large number of vessels around Taiwan, with the Taiwanese military reporting the largest number of naval ships deployed by China since 1996. An uptick in air incursions has also taken place, with 47 detected between 6 AM on Monday and 6 AM on Tuesday. At the same time, it is yet unclear how many ships there are. Reuters reported yesterday that 90 coast guard and naval vessels had been detected, but the Taiwanese military has stated that only 12 naval vessels and nine other ships were detected.

The deployment of naval vessels is clearly a reaction to President Lai Ching-te’s first overseas trip in late November and early December, during which Lai transited through the US. Lai first transited in Hawai’i, during which he had a video call with former US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, as well as through the US territory of Guam on his return trip.

It was expected that China would militarily react to Lai’s trip, which started on November 30th and ended when Lai returned to Taiwan on December 6th. As such, Taiwanese defense officials and diplomatic officials stated ahead of time that they expected a Chinese military response and called on China to exercise restraint.

On December 9th, China later announced seven areas of airspace that were reserved until December 11th. This followed up on how last month, China announced seven reserved areas from November 28th to November 30th.

Taiwanese defense officials have stated that drills this time around are more threatening to Taiwan during China’s Joint Sword 2024A exercise in May and its Joint Sword 2024B exercise in October, as the current naval deployment is larger than either of the two exercises–as well as, one notes, than during the 2022 military drills that followed then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

Taiwanese defense officials have stated that the current deployment is directed not only at Taiwan but also other regional actors, seeing ships are deployed throughout the First Island Chain. This is the first time that this has taken place. Taiwanese defense officials have also stated that Chinese military activity is intended to practice for a blockade, in practicing denying other countries access to Taiwan. Former US defense officials have stated that the routinization of Chinese drills would also increase China’s ability to deny access to Taiwan, in making it easier for China to take other countries by surprise.

Ships are present not only around Taiwan, but in the East and South China Seas, and around the southern Japanese archipelago. Around 2/3rd of the ships are naval vessels, while the other ships are Coast Guard ships, illustrating how Coast Guard vessels are incorporated into Chinese drills.

In spite of this, the Chinese government has yet to formally announce any drills. China may hope to keep Taiwan on guard and to create social uncertainty, in suggesting that it can conduct drills any time it wishes, but not formally announcing “Joint Sword 2024C”, as a response to Lai’s overseas trip. This would be a form of “strategic ambiguity” employed by the Chinese military. Or China may eventually announce ‘Joint Sword 2024C”–the naming of the set of exercises was clearly intended to convey that there would be future exercises, but it may also be in China’s interests to convey a sense of uncertainty.

The Taiwanese military has stated that it has established a command center to observe and monitor the threats. It has also announced response drills, which it has framed as taking advantage of opportunity offered by China’s actions.

Still, to date, there has been a lack of strong responses in Taiwanese society to the drills This proves similar to social reactions in response to the two previous Joint Sword exercises, as well as to the unnamed set of military drills that Taiwan conducted after the August 2022 Pelosi visit.

For one, Taiwanese society has become inured to Chinese military drills after decades of threats. Chinese military threats in the 1990s and 2000s did lead to an uptick in migration out of Taiwan, but this has not been the case with Chinese threats in the past few years.

In this sense, over the past decades, China has not managed to convey any sense of progressive, developing threat directed at Taiwan, with threats instead becoming routinized and part of the background noise of everyday life. If China’s primary aim with its military drills is to intimidate Taiwanese away from militarily resisting any efforts at an invasion, as a means of psychological warfare, this suggests they have not been effective. However, if China’s aim is to routinize threats so that the public is caught off guard if it does one day strike, then perhaps China is in fact accomplishing its current military aims.
No more articles