Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Lai Ching-te/Facebook
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT has rejected a call by the Lai administration to establish a new cross-strait framework.
The move to create a new cross-strait framework is an unexpected move from the Lai administration. Namely, much of the international world has focused exclusively on Lai’s inauguration and National Day speech as a possible occasion on which Lai might try to push for a political position more in the direction of Taiwanese independence.
By contrast, there has been little attention to the Lai administration’s proposal for a new cross-strait framework, though to be sure, the move had few prior warnings.
Specifically, the Lai administration outreached to the Chinese government through the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), calling for new talks with China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) to establish a “Two Six Consensus.”
The parallels with the 1992 Consensus are deliberate, seeing as the 1992 Consensus was the result of talks between SEF and ARATS. Presumably, this would have been aimed at superseding the 1992 Consensus, excepting establishing a new consensus that would not serve as a means of justifying Chinese claims over Taiwan as the 1992 Consensus has come to do, but maintaining guarantees of Taiwan’s sovereignty.
The idea of a possible new consensus that would supersede the 1992 Consensus has been floated before, but more commonly by the KMT. Former KMT chair Hung Hsiu-chu, a pro-unification diehard, previously called for what she termed an “advanced version” of the 1992 Consensus that would shift from “One China, respective interpretations” to “One China, same interpretation.”
At the time of the 2015 meeting between then-ROC president Ma Ying-jeou and Chinese president Xi Jinping, some analysts believed that Ma and Xi would attempt to create a “2015 Consensus” superseding the 1992 Consensus on the basis of the meeting, seeing as a meeting between the PRC and ROC heads of state far supersedes a meeting between the SEF and ARATS in stature. Nevertheless, this did not occur. But seeing as the idea of creating a new consensus to supersede the 1992 Consensus has usually come from the KMT, it is surprising to see the idea come from Lai.
Former president Tsai Ing-wen (left) and president Lai Ching-te (right). Photo credit: Lai Ching-te/Facebook
On the other hand, it may not be surprising that the idea was dismissed out of hand by the Chinese government, then. The Chinese government has continued efforts to frame Lai as pro-independence, with the People’s Daily publishing a speech by former president Ma Ying-jeou framing recent comments by Lai as a two-state theory of Taiwanese independence. No doubt this was expected by the Lai administration.
But the idea is likely to recur under the Lai administration. With the proposal, one sees why Lai aimed to appoint unusually high-ranking members of the DPP to the SEF, in order to elevate the importance of the SEF ahead of this proposal.
From the proposal, one can make several observations about the Lai administration’s political aims, then. Lai wants to frame himself as willing to engage in dialogue with the Chinese government, even if this is likely to be dismissed. To this extent, even as the DPP has criticized the idea proposed by the KMT of signing a peace treaty with the Chinese government because of the strong possibility that this would involve signing away some aspects of Taiwan’s sovereignty, the Lai administration does hope to negotiate with China.
This is no different than the Tsai administration, which also said it would be willing to conduct negotiations with the Chinese government if it was on the basis of mutual parity and respect, and proves another means in which the Lai administration represents continuity rather than a break from the Tsai administration. At the same time, one can also come to several insights about Lai’s political style from the move, in that Lai is a more subtle political operator than many have given him credit for. It apparently is far less Lai’s style to announce a declaration of aspirations toward a new consensus, but instead to build up to it through existing institutions, even as international perceptions are often still that Lai would potentially unilaterally declare moves toward independence in the manner of a Chen Shui-bian.