by Brian Hioe

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Photo Credit: Screenshot

CHINA ANNOUNCED A new round of military exercises around Taiwan, titled “Joint Sword-2024B”, this morning. This confirms, then, suspicions that the Chinese government would use Lai’s National Day address on October 10th as a pretext to launch military drills around Taiwan.

The areas in which China has announced drilling differ from the first “Joint Sword” exercises, “Joint Sword-2024A”, which were held shortly after Lai’s presidential inauguration on May 20th. The title “Joint Sword-2024A” implied that the exercises could be part of a series of military drills, seeing as “2024A” implied that there potentially would be further exercises. Both series of exercises follow suit from the exercises that China carried out after then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, though this set of exercises was not named, as well as drills in April 2023. The drills occurred despite calls by the US on China to show restraint after Lai’s National Day address.

Some areas where China is conducting drilling are closer to Taiwan than in past drills. There was a lack of 24-hour prior warning about the drills, as well as a lack of specified coordinates that they will take place within. There was no clear end time for the drills specified in the initial announcement, though at the end of the day, it was announced that the drills were over. Passenger flights were unaffected by the drilling so far.

As with the preceding Joint Sword drills, areas around Taiwan’s outlying island of Matsu are among the places where drills will take place, though more specific areas are outlined for drilling than the preceding Joint Sword exercise. The Taiwanese Coast Guard stated that it expelled four Chinese Coast Guard vessels that entered restricted waters of Matsu today. Likewise, Chinese Coast Guard ships have been detected as crossing the median line of the Taiwan Straits in an irregular manner, rather than moving as convoys.

Apart from 125 warplanes detected around Taiwan since 5 AM, one of China’s aircraft carriers–the Liaoning–is currently sailing toward the Bashi Channel. The Liaoning’s movements were previously understood as possibly related to such anticipated threats from China. The number of warplanes around Taiwan sets a new record.

A Reuters report shortly before National Day stated that the Taiwanese government viewed exercises as likely to happen regardless of what Lai said. Likewise, the Taiwanese government has generally emphasized that it was aware of the movements of the Chinese military in the days before and after National Day. It would not be surprising if movements in preparation for such drills were already known by the Taiwanese government ahead of time and this information deliberately publicized.

Lai’s speech was generally interpreted as an effort at restraint by international observers, which is noteworthy. Although during his inauguration speech, Lai largely emphasized the same stances as his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, this was still read by international observers as a more pro-independence stance than Lai.

Consequently, some interpreted Chinese drills that followed the inauguration as merely an increase to Lai’s comments, rather than something that was planned regardless of what Lai would have said–though, of course, it would take time for China to move materiel in place to conduct such drilling.

But with international assessments of Lai’s National Day speech more clearly taking the perspective that Lai aimed to show restraint this time around, it is more likely that international assessments will also swing in the direction of seeing these drills as probable to have taken place irrespective of Lai’s comments, and that this is a move aimed at regularizing military activity around Taiwan. Those who take the opposite are more likely to be individuals who, similarly, would frame anything Lai could have or would have said as provocative. On the other hand, it is still unclear as to the array of conflicting interests in the PRC that pushed for this reaction to Lai’s comments.

It is important to note that military analysts have pointed to “Joint Sword-2024B” as exercising in preparation for a blockade. It has also increasingly been a matter of concern in past years that China could launch a blockade using the pretext of exercises, hence why concern about irregular activity by the Chinese military is dangerous. On the other hand, an invasion scenario is improbable, seeing as with an invasion, troops would be detected amassing on the shores of China months in advance. Again, it would take China time to move materiel in place, rather than that an invasion or other military contingency could break out at the drop of a hat.

Tellingly, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office announced the addition of three new names to its list of Taiwanese separatists. These are DPP legislator Puma Shen, formerly the chair of the disinformation research center Doublethink Lab and civil defense training organization Kuma Academy, UMC founder Robert Tsao, who has in past years become an outspoken critic of the Chinese government and funder of initiatives as the Kuma Academy aimed at combating Chinese influence. Lastly, the Kuma Academy itself is listed.

China announced additions to its Taiwanese separatist list around the time of Lai’s inauguration, too, though no section on its website existed to publicize this list when this occurred in May. As such, announcing additions to this list around the time of military drills may be part of China’s script for annual national events where the Taiwanese president comments on cross-strait affairs such as National Day in October and during presidential inaugurations.

It is not particularly surprising that Shen and Tsao would be sanctioned by the Chinese government, seeing as they are already national-level figures critical of the CCP. This continues the pattern of the Chinese government singling out individuals who were already national-level figures when it comes to sanctions targeting individuals it frames as Taiwanese separatists.

It is unclear what listing the Kuma Academy means, seeing as it is an organization and not an individual. Strangely, the TAO does not actually list the Kuma Academy on its website regarding sanctioned individuals, though Shen and Tsao’s names have been added.

Nevertheless, one notes that both Shen and Tsao are associated with the Kuma Academy. One can perhaps view the sanctioning of all three individuals as an indication that the Chinese government fears efforts at bolstering civil defense in Taiwan. Moreover, one has noted that the Chinese government has suggested sanctioning pro-independence organizations or companies for some time. It is possible that China will soon announce a similar public list for organizations and companies.

The online list on the website of the Taiwan Affairs Office

Strangely enough, DPP presidents Lai Ching-te and Tsai Ing-wen are not listed, apparently because China wishes to keep the door open for negotiation.

As it is ambiguous if staff at the Kuma Academy are also to be sanctioned, or if this applies to anyone who has attended Kuma Academy events, it is to be seen whether the list dissuades members of the public from attending civil defense trainings at the Kuma Academy. This would be with the view that this could be dangerous if the Chinese government obtains information about who has attended these trainings. Alternatively, it is possible that the Chinese government’s actions instead draw further attention to the Kuma Academy’s trainings, in the way that no publicity is bad publicity.

It is improbable that China could target all attendees of Kuma Academy trainings, as the number is in the tens of thousands, if it were to do so, it would likely simply target a few prominent individuals. Either way, while the Kuma Academy and Enoch Wu’s Forward Alliance are the most internationally known civil defense groups in Taiwan, they are only two of a larger constellation of organizations.

It is to be seen what China’s latest iteration of the Joint Sword exercises entail in the coming days, then. It is not yet clear if the Joint Sword exercises attract international attention, as with the military drills that followed the Pelosi visit. Yet one recalls that the preceding round of Joint Sword exercises attracted relatively sparse attention.
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