Jasmine Chanby Jasmine Chan and Brian Hioe
語言:
English
Photo Credit: Taiwan People’s Party
TEN YEARS HAVE passed since the Sunflower Movement. In the past ten years, one notes how historical verdicts on the Sunflower Movement have changed over time.
Sometimes there has been the tendency to have a retroactive view of the movement, in which the movement is viewed as a success because the Tsai administration swept to power on the basis of political momentum after the movement. At the same time, at present, with demonstrations set to again take place outside of the legislature over legislative changes that the KMT aims to force through the legislature, this seems to point to or imply that some of the tasks of the Sunflower Movement are incomplete.
But, to this end, one also sees how memories of the Sunflower Movement continue to be contested. There are individuals who emerged from the movement or rode to power on the basis of momentum from the movement, such as Huang Kuo-chang or Ko Wen-je, who have embraced the legislatures and sided with the KMT. As observed in the demonstrations that they themselves have organized in past days, they themselves also claim the legacy of the Sunflower Movement–ironically enough, to push for political changes that stand counter to the movement’s aims, and in alliance with the KMT that the movement resisted.
TPP caucus convener Huang Kuo-chang. Photo credit: Huang Kuo-chang/Facebook
Perhaps this points to some of the shortcomings of the movement. Namely, there was a wave of civic participation by young people after the movement. The view of young people shifted from their being derided as a soft and weak “strawberry generation” that was not as hardy as their boomer parents to the view that young people were brave and willing to take risks for what they believed in. Consequently, many youth entered politics afterward, either joining NGOs and civil society groups, entering government, becoming part of political parties, or running as political candidates. This put Tsai ing-wen of the DPP into office and led to the DPP holding the majority in the legislature for the first time in its history.
Nevertheless, perhaps this points to what the movement did not accomplish. Namely, entrenched political corruption and clientelism have long existed at the grassroots of Taiwanese politics, and proves difficult to root the KMT out of networks it has long dominated. This is why the KMT and pan-Blue camp would make a resurgence in the legislature in past years.
One of the slogans of the Sunflower Movement during the withdrawal from the legislature ten years ago was “Reaching out to sow seeds”. Looking back today, we can ask ourselves, was this goal achieved at that time? With the current controversy regarding the legal amendments pushed for by the TPP and KMT and the extension of the high-speed rail and freeway proposed by KMT caucus convener Fu Kun-chi, we can see such aims were not achieved after the Sunflower Movement. That is, the ecology of Taiwan’s local politics has not changed much. Most voters outside Taipei are still dominated by the power of local factions.
After the Sunflower Movement, many young people left Taipei and chose to return to their hometowns to work. Whether they became part of traditional industries such as farming, tried to build communities, or opened coffee shops, they aimed to use various means to bring more citizen power to local areas and promote more social dialogue. There are some good developments, such as Liu Yuyu, who came from the Yuanli Anti-Windmill Self-Rescue Association, and was elected mayor of Yuanli in 2022.
However, most people have unfortunately faced structural setbacks. Looking at the ten-year axis, Huang Kuo-chang and Ko Wen-je are both key factors that hinder the “sowing strategy” adopted at the end of the Sunflower Movement.
The civic energy of the Sunflower Movement that hoped for a break from the traditional blue-green framework that has long dominated Taiwanese politics was channeled into the New Power Party (NPP) after the Sunflower Movement. Huang Kuo-Chang was very active in the early days of the party, and he gradually consolidated his core power in the NPP’s central standing committee.
Local party members who did not obey his opinions were gradually suppressed. Lin Cheng-fang, who has been deeply involved in Yilan for many years and cares about literature and history, and Liao Yu-hsien, who returned to Yunlin and had actively participated in Anti-Media Monopoly Movement and other protests, were both stifled by him in the name of the standing committee. When writer Neil Peng resigned from the party in 2017, he said that the NPP had become a party dominated by Huang Guochang. Of course, the NPP that still exists now has different party members.
From 2017 to 2018, when Ko Wen-je was still Taipei mayor, writer Wu Yin-ning served as the general manager of the Taipei Agricultural Products Marketing Corporation (TAPMC). Although TAPMC is under the Taipei city government, Ko sought to make things difficult for Wu Yinning. During her time in TAPMC, Wu Yin-ning worked hard to make the rules and regulations more transparent, with the purpose of countering the hidden political and economic factional struggles behind the big business of agricultural products distribution.
One key thing to know here is that in running local politics in Taiwan, if a candidate has the support of Farmers’ Association, Fishermen’s Association, Irrigation Association or folk religious temples, you are almost guaranteed to win votes. Namely, these institutions are closely related to the livelihood interests of local people.
This has led to the consequence that local voters are drawn to the mentality that they do not need to know about controversial bill discussions in the Legislative Yuan and, in this way, denied democratic literacy. What they see is who can make them get benefits in the stores they run and make the business they are engaged in more profitable.
TPP chair Ko Wen-je. Photo credit: Ko Wen-je/Facebook
At the same time, powerful and wealthy local factions, who may be linked to organized crime or are gangsters themselves, are able to dominate these institutions. Hsieh Yi-fong’s family in Changhua, the Chang Rong-wei family in Yunlin, Yan Ching-piao’s family in Taichung, and the Fu Kun-chi’s family in Hualien all built local power in this way. And these factions all belong to the KMT.
At present, the KMT and the TPP control the majority of seats in the legislature, largely because local politics are still very conservative. Judging from the conflicts in the past few days, it is not a surprising consequence that such local elected public representatives have ignored democracy.
Ten years have passed, and the Sunflower Movement’s goal of “Reaching out to sow seeds” seems to be still far away. However, a group of local political workers, NGO advocates, social activists, and researchers jointly compiled the “Taiwan Local Politics Reader: Questions, Practices, and Reflections from the Young Generations” (台灣地方政治讀本：來自青年世代的提問、實踐與反思) to reveal the dark side of local politics operating under the table. Once they understand how the system works, concerned citizens can at least know how to resist it.