Brian Hioeby Brian Hioe
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Photo Credit: Lai Ching-te/Facebook
WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT LAI CHING-TE’S inauguration set for May 20th, there will be a significant amount of public attention on his inaugural address. This is particularly the case given the implications for cross-strait relations.
Public attention will primarily focus on the question of how Lai refers to Taiwan’s sovereignty, how he refers to the ROC, and on what footing he seeks to conduct relations with China. This will be especially focused on given Lai’s past statements as Tainan mayor referring to himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence.”
Still, Lai sought to moderate his history of such statements in the course of the 2024 election cycle. Lai has instead emphasized that he will continue the foreign policy of Tsai Ing-wen, as well as that he and the DPP regard the ROC as already sovereign and independent and, in this way, not needing to declare independence.
Consequently, Lai is unlikely to make any drastic statements that are pro-independence, nor is Lai likely to hit out against ROC institutions. Instead, Lai is more likely to try and strike a conciliatory tone toward China.
Namely, Lai is all too aware of international fears that he might prove to be a dangerous provocateur on cross-strait relations in pushing for formal independence, as the first DPP president, Chen Shui-bian, was sometimes perceived as. Such fears have led to, for example, calls for the DPP to scrap the independence clause in its party charter, though the DPP already froze the clause in 1999. Likewise, Lai is aware that if he were to hew in that direction, the KMT would seek to frame him as endangering Taiwan, so as to politically attack his new government.
President-elect Lai Ching-te. Photo credit: Lai Ching-te/Facebook
Indeed, the KMT has called on Lai to dial back cross-strait tensions with his inaugural speech. It is probable, however, that whatever Lai says, this will be leveraged on by the KMT to criticize the DPP. The KMT, after all, has historically sought to justify its rationale for holding power on the basis of the claim that it is the only political party in Taiwan able to conduct stable cross-strait relations with China and communicate with the CCP.
By contrast, the KMT has framed the DPP as having deteriorated cross-strait relations because of its pro-independence political agenda, and as unnecessarily provoking China. It is probable that whatever Lai says, the KMT will frame this as pro-independence. The KMT may criticize Lai, for instance, for not referring to the 1992 Consensus.
It is unlikely that China will accept any olive branches from Lai either, with it more probable that China will similarly try to frame Lai as a dangerous pro-independence provocateur. It is a question, too, whether China will conduct military exercises in a similar timeframe as the inauguration as a show of force against Taiwan, which may be influenced by how the international world reacts to the Lai inauguration.
The KMT legislative caucus has stated that it will not be attending the inauguration, citing official duties. Of KMT mayors, only Taichung mayor Lu Shiow-yen will be attending, with Taipei mayor Chiang Wan-an and New Taipei mayor Hou You-yi declining to attend, also citing work. The TPP, however, has stated that it is up to individual members to decide whether to attend, with party chair Ko Wen-je planning on attending, and caucus convener Huang Kuo-chang planning on attending half of the ceremony.
The DPP has called on its own legislators and those from other parties to attend the inauguration, as a sign of support for the institutions of Taiwanese democracy. The DPP has criticized KMT legislators for justifying not attending on the basis of work in the legislature, despite plans by a KMT delegation to travel to Itu Aba/Taiping Island and a previous trip by 17 KMT lawmakers to China as part of a delegation led by KMT legislative caucus convener Fu Kun-chi even as the legislature is in session.
Indeed, the trip to Itu Aba/Taiping Island was likely deliberately timed for immediately before the inauguration. Pan-Blue legislators called for Tsai Ing-wen to visit Itu Aba/Taiping Island to reiterate territorial claims of the ROC over Itu Aba/Taiping Island. With Tsai and other DPP legislators declining to attend, this is likely to be used for political ammunition to frame the DPP as uninterested in defending the sovereignty of the ROC. But the KMT visit may also be aimed at undermining ties between Taiwan and potential regional allies that also claim Itu Aba/Taiping Island, while also reiterating PRC claims over Itu Aba/Taiping Island that are based on the ROC’s claims.
In a similar timeframe, the KMT has also pushed for Lai to deliver a state of the nation address to the legislature. After negotiations between the DPP and the KMT, this will take place sometime after the inauguration address and takes place on the heels of similar efforts by the KMT to push for the premier to address the legislature. At the same time, it is probable that the KMT similarly hopes that this state of the nation address will provide an opportunity for political protests and will aim to use it as fodder for political attacks–it is not impossible that the KMT would, in fact, boycott this state of the nation address.